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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000405

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/ERA

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [EU](#) [LO](#) [GG](#) [RU](#)

SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER GYMnich: SLOVAKIA SUPPORTS U.S. LINE ON  
GEORGIA

REF: A) STATE 093264 B) STATE 093272

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission, Keith Eddins for reasons 1.4 b  
and d

11. (SBU) Pol/Econ Chief delivered reftel points to the MFA's  
EU Correspondent, Albin Oltruba, and also shared them with  
the Directors of the Balkan and CIS offices. Oltruba noted  
that Georgia would be the main focus of the meeting, with  
continued planning and consultation on the scope and timing  
of an ESDP Mission front and center. Oltruba said that the  
September 8 visit to Moscow of President Sarkozy would be  
critical, and that he thought it likely that the September 15  
GAERC would be in a position to officially approve a mission.  
Oltruba noted strong Slovak support for a reinvigorated  
Transatlantic dialogue, but offered no comment in response to  
our concerns about the "universal values" discussion.

12. (SBU) On Georgia, MFA CIS Director Rozkapal expressed  
complete agreement with the U.S. position as laid out in ref  
A, but was less sanguine about the prospects for progress  
during the upcoming Sarkozy-Medvedev meetings. Rozkapal  
highlighted that the same roadblocks preventing agreement on  
a Military Monitoring Mission (MMO) in the OCSE would pertain  
to the EU, and that no actions should be undertaken that  
would convey de facto recognition of South Ossetia or  
Abkhazia. He also noted that the Slovaks might organize a  
Ministerial-level meeting on the Slovak-Ukraine border to  
mark the implementation of a border traffic agreement, but  
also to show support and solidarity with Ukraine.

13. (C) Foreign Minister Kubis will brief the Ambassadorial  
Corps on September 8 on the Slovak position on Georgia. (He  
will also provide an update on Slovak-Hungarian relations in  
the wake of the September 1 meeting in Brussels between Prime  
Ministers Gyurscany and Fico.) Following PM Fico's initial  
comments on the Georgian conflict, in which he essentially  
blamed Georgia for provoking the conflict, Ambassador has  
reached out to a range of senior officials to urge that Fico  
moderate his line and express more clearly his support for  
Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity. On August  
27, Ambassador telephoned Fico's foreign policy advisor,  
Marek Estok, to ask that the Prime Minister include a  
supportive comment regarding Georgia during his speech in  
Banska Bystrica on anniversary of the Slovak National  
Uprising. Fico did so, stating that Slovakia supports the  
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.

14. (C) Comment: With PM Fico it is often one step forward and  
two steps back. In Banska Bystrica Fico linked -- as he did  
in public comments following the EU Summit on September 1 --  
Slovakia's position on Kosovo and Georgia. In Brussels, he  
was quoted as saying: "Slovakia has not recognized Kosovo. I  
will look directly into the eyes of everyone at the European

Council when they speak about Georgia's territorial integrity." He added that: "I would have welcomed it if Georgia's role in this conflict had been emphasized to a greater extent, especially as far as provocations are concerned." Apparently, however, Fico didn't push for such language at the Summit, and the MFA continues to pursue a constructive course. Embassy will send septel thoughts on de-linking Kosovo and Georgia and on how we might move the ball forward on GOS recognition of Kosovo.

OBSITNIK